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Abstract. Most negotiation support systems have focused upon the notion of meeting the disputants’ interests.  
However in the legal domain, Alternative Dispute Resolution often occurs in the shadow of the law. Integrative 
bargaining neglects the vital issues of justice and power.  In this article we address the issue of how to add 
notions of fairness to interests, through the development of the Family_Mediator system.  Family_Mediator is 
an extension of the Family_Winner system, which advises mediators about potential trade-offs and 
compensation strategies for divorcing couples. 
 
Keywords: Fairness; Interest Based Negotiation; Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law; Justice; Trade-Offs; 




There has been a global movement towards encouraging disputants to resolve conflicts without the 
need for litigation. The development of negotiation support systems has supported this trend (Lodder 
and Zeleznikow 2005). Commentators have questioned whether such developments have always 
taken into account notions of justice and fairness (Alexander, 1997; Raines and Conley Tyler, 2007). 
In particular, has this trend led to certain parties being unjustly treated? 
For example, are accused persons disadvantaged in guilty plea negotiations because of a lack of 
available information on sentencing precedents?   Are some parties before the Family Court accepting 
outcomes which are unjust to both themselves and/or their children? In addition to the standard 
problems associated with the use of decision support systems (such as usability), how can we ensure 
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that the advice tendered by negotiation support systems is ‘reasonable’, ‘consistent’ and ‘based upon 
publicly acceptable principles’? 
Traditional Negotiation Support Systems have focused upon providing users with decision support 
on how they might best obtain their goals.  They are often based on Nash’s principles of optimal 
negotiation or bargaining (Nash 1953).  The aim is to develop a win-win scenario.  Such situations are 
described in (Raiffa, 1982), AdjustedWinner (Brams and Taylor 1996) and Family_Winner (Bellucci 
and Zeleznikow 2006).  
(Fisher and Ury 1981) distinguish three modes of negotiation: 
1. Interest based negotiation; 
2. Justice based negotiation; and  
3. Power based negotiation. 
Whilst many negotiations involve two or all three modes, most negotiation decision support has 
focused upon interest based or integrative negotiation.  This is quite natural in areas such as online 
auctions (for example the operations of E-Bay) or e-commerce, where logical consumers will only 
engage in actions that are beneficial (in terms of their utility function).  But in other domains, 
particularly regarding legal disputes, issues of power and justice must be taken into account.   
For example, the concept of power in international disputes is a vital one.  Despite the existence of 
the United Nations and the International Court of Justice; in times of conflict, smaller countries often 
need to abide by the desires of economically and militarily stronger countries. In a legal dispute 
between a consumer and large multinational company, it is usually the case that only the company has 
the financial resources to undertake a long and drawn out process of litigation and conflict. 
Whilst the issue of power in negotiations is an important one, we shall not investigate it in this 
article.  Rather, we shall focus upon how we can integrate notions of fairness or justice into an 
interest-based negotiation support system.  We shall illustrate our ideas in the domain of Australian 
Family Law mediation, and also briefly discuss an application in the domain of plea-bargaining about 
sentences for criminal activities. In both domains, negotiations over outcomes invariably involve 
bargaining in the shadow of a trial. 
2 BATNAs 
Given our goal is to provide tools to support negotiation in the shadow of a trial, we need to examine 
the notions of BATNAs.  
2.1 The Notion of a BATNA 
Fisher and Ury (1981) introduced the notion of a BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated 
Agreement) concept as a tool for negotiators to cope with power imbalances, e.g. one party may have 
a stronger bargaining position, or more (financial) resources than her opponent. They claim that, if 
negotiators do take account of their options outside a negotiation, they are better protected against 
agreements that should be rejected. It also helps them to reach agreements that better satisfy their 
interests. In order to assess whether an offer should be rejected, a party in a dispute has to establish 
what can be accomplished in alternative procedures to the one currently being conducted. This may 
include exiting the procedure altogether, or handing over the case to a court. Once the alternatives are 
known, these can be compared to what one expects to win by accepting an offer in the current 
procedure. If the proposal is worse than the (best) alternative outside the procedure, it should be 
rejected; if it is better it should be considered for acceptance. In this respect each party's BATNA 
serves as a point of reference or a value with which to compare offers (Raiffa et al. 2002, p. 112).  
The second reason why knowing one’s BATNA is important, is that it influences negotiation 
power. Parties who are aware of their alternatives will be more confident about trying to negotiate a 
solution that better serves their interests (de Vries et al 2005). When trying to sell one's car to a 
second hand car dealer, knowing what other car salesmen (or even individuals) offer or have offered 
for your (or a similar) car, helps in obtaining a reasonable price for your vehicle.  
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BATNAs not only serve a purpose in evaluating offers in the dispute, they can also play a role in 
determining whether or not to accept a certain dispute resolution method.  Mnookin (2003) wrote that 
having an accurate BATNA is part of the armory one should use to evaluate whether or not to agree 
to enter a negotiation. 
In their development of a three step model for Online Dispute Resolution, (Lodder and 
Zeleznikow 2005) evaluated the order in which online disputes are best resolved. They suggested the 
following sequencing:  
1. First, the negotiation support tool should provide feedback on the likely outcome(s) of the 
dispute if the negotiation were to fail – i.e. the BATNA. 
2. Second, the tool should attempt to resolve any existing conflicts using dialogue 
techniques. 
3. Third, for those issues not resolved in step two, the tool should employ 
compensation/trade-off strategies in order to facilitate resolution of the dispute. 
4. Finally, if the result from step three is not acceptable to the parties, the tool should allow 
the parties to return to step two and repeat the process recursively until either the dispute 
is resolved or a stalemate occurs. 
The model suggests that an important first step in providing negotiation decision support is 
developing relevant BATNAs.  We will next discuss how we have developed BATNAs in Australian 
family law.  A brief description of our work on developing BATNAs in sentencing is given in section 
5.  Extended details can be found in (Hall et al 2005).   
Lodder and Zeleznikow’s model, in suggesting providing advice about BATNAs, facilitating 
dialogue and suggesting trade-offs, focuses upon E-Commerce applications.  Their research assumes 
that disputants focus upon interests.  As we shall see, there are many legal disputes in which notions 
of fairness or justice must be considered. 
Calculating one’s BATNA is an important step in the decision whether to go to court or to 
mediate. Ideally, such a decision is based on a well-informed choice, although unfortunately, the 
information necessary to make such a decision is often lacking. It is important to provide litigants 
with information about the expected outcome of court proceedings. For example, data mining 
techniques1 or semantic web technology2
At the moment, there is no generic tool available for determining BATNAs. As an example of 
how machine learning may be used to help determine one’s BATNA, we will describe a software tool 
currently used in the Australian family law arena, Split-Up (Stranieri et al 1999). 
 can be used to determine a BATNA. 
2.2 The Split-Up system: providing BATNAS for property distribution in Australian 
Family Law 
In the Split-Up project (Stranieri et al 1999) wished to model how Australian Family Court judges 
exercise discretion in distributing marital property following divorce.   They used machine learning to 
model how judges perform the distribution. Whilst the Split—Up system was not originally designed 
to support legal negotiation, it is capable of doing so.  Split—Up can be directly used to proffer 
advice in determining your BATNA.  The following example, taken from (Bellucci and Zeleznikow 
2001), illustrates this point. 
Suppose the disputants' goals are entered into the Split—Up system to determine the asset 
distributions for both W and H. Split—Up first shows both W and H what they would be expected to 
be awarded by a court if their relative claims were accepted. The litigants are able to have dialogues 
with the Split—Up system about hypothetical situations. Given the requirements of W and H in a 
                                                 
 
1  See (Stranieri and Zeleznikow 2004) and section 2.3. 
2  For a discussion of the use of semantic web technology to help develop BATNAs in the domain of  Dutch 
Liability Law, see (Klein et al 2006). 
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hypothetical example, the Split—Up system provided the following answers as to the percentages of 
the distributable assets received by each partner: 
 
Resolution H’s % W’s % 
Given one accepts W’s beliefs 35 65 
Given one accepts H’s beliefs 58 42 
Given one accepts H’s beliefs but gives W  custody of children 40  60 
 
Clearly, custody of the children is very significant in determining the husband’s property 
distribution. If he were unlikely to win custody of the children, the husband would be well advised to 
accept 40 percent of the common pool (otherwise he would also risk paying large legal fees and 
having ongoing conflict). 
While Split-Up is a decision support system rather than a negotiation support system, it does 
provide disputants with their respective BATNAs and hence provides an important starting point for 
negotiations. However, more than a BATNA calculation is required of negotiation support systems. 
Namely, a negotiation support system should model the structure of an argument, provide advice on 
how to sequence the negotiation, and propose solutions. 
The use of BATNAS and trade-offs, assumes all parties are involved in interest-based or 
integrative negotiations. Such negotiations focus on developing mutually beneficial agreements based 
on the interests of the disputants. However there are some scenarios where the concept of justice 
based negotiation must take precedence over integrative negotiation.3
3 Integrative Negotiation 
  
Walton and Mckersie (1965) propose that negotiation processes can be classified as distributive or 
integrative.  In distributive approaches, the problems are seen as “zero sum” and resources are 
imagined as fixed: divide the pie.  In integrative approaches, problems are seen as having more 
potential solutions than are immediately obvious and the goal is to expand the pie before dividing it.  
Parties attempt to accommodate as many interests of each of the parties as possible, leading to the so-
called win-win or all gain approach.  As (Kersten 2001) notes although Walton and McKersie did not 
suggest one type of negotiation being superior to the other, over the years, it has become conventional 
wisdom that the integrative type allows for better compromises, win-win solutions, value creation and 
expanding the pie. (Fisher and Ury 1981) and (Lax and Sebenius 1986) discuss these issues in detail. 
Game theory, as opposed to behavioural and descriptive studies, provides formal and normative 
approaches to model bargaining. One of the distinctive key features of game theory is the 
consideration of zero-sum and non-zero-sum games.  These concepts were adopted to distinguish 
between distributive and integrative processes.  
Limitations of game theory in providing prescriptive advice sought by disputants and their 
advisers on one hand, and the developments in multicriteria decision-making and interactive methods 
on the other, provided the groundwork for negotiation analysis as discussed in (Raiffa 1982).  Game 
theory has been used as the basis for the Adjusted Winner algorithm (Brams and Taylor 1996) and the 
negotiation support systems: Smartsettle (Thiessen and McMahon 2000) and Family Winner 
(Bellucci and Zeleznikow 2006). 
                                                 
 
3 For example, in Australian Family, the interests of the children are paramount. So a Family Law judge can 
override a negotiated settlement between the parents if she does not believe the agreement meets the need of the 
children. This issue is discussed in section 3.4 an in further detail in Bellucci and Zeleznikow (2006). 
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3.1 Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law 
Whilst the concept of negotiation has a long history, the modern Alternative Dispute Resolution 
movement in the law can be traced back to Sander (1976).   
The concept of bargaining in the shadow of the law is significant in the context of the negotiation 
of disputes.  We shall introduce the notion of a utility function as a method for supporting such 
bargaining.  We examine, in detail, the utility function we have developed for interest-based negation 
in the field of family law. We conclude by examining our current research on plea-bargaining.  
(Bibas 2004) argues that the conventional wisdom is that litigants bargain towards settlement in 
the shadow of expected trial outcomes. In this model, rational parties forecast the expected trial 
outcome and strike bargains that leave both sides better off by splitting the saved costs of trial. … 
This shadow of trial model now dominates the literature on civil settlements. Mnookin and 
Kornhauser (1979) introduced the shadow of trial concept. By examining the case of divorce law, 
they contended that legal rights of each party could be understood as bargaining chips that can affect 
settlement outcomes. Bibas (2004) has noted that some scholars treat plea-bargaining as simply 
another case of bargaining in the shadow of a trial. 
Cooter et al (1982) discuss this issue for civil cases.  Posner (1973) claims that the usual approach 
to bargaining in the legal setting assumes that trial is caused by excessive optimism on behalf of both 
the plaintiff and the defendant. Posner (1995) focuses upon legal pragmatism and law and economics. 
He views law not as formalistic argumentation, but as competition for resources.  Under this model 
the competing parties have a utility function which they attempt to maximize. 
In discussing notions of justice in negotiation, Byrne and Cropanzano (2001) consider distributive, 
procedural and interactional justice.  Distributive justice concerns what is just or right with respect to 
the allocation of goods in a society. (Fletcher 1996) notes that distributive justice relies on the 
assumption that a central authority has control over all things, good and bad, that can be possessed.  
The act of distribution is designed to realise a just relationship amongst two or more claimants. 
Procedural justice is concerned with making and implementing decisions according to fair 
processes. (Rawls 1971) argues that if the procedures for choosing principles of justice are fair, then 
the outcome will be just.  Interactional justice considers the degree to which the people affected by a 
decision are treated with politeness, dignity, and respect. It focuses on the interpersonal treatment 
people receive when procedures are implemented. 
In most legal domains, dispute resolution focuses upon bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, 
rather than integrative bargaining.  This point will be highlighted in our discussion of family 
mediation decision support systems. 
3.2 Using Game Theory to support Integrative Bargaining 
The Adjusted Winner point-allocation model {(Brams and Taylor 1996) and (Brams and Taylor 
1999)} is a procedure whereby items/issues are allocated to the disputants on the basis of whoever 
values the item/issue more. The disputants are required to indicate explicitly how much they value 
each of the different issues by distributing 100 points across the range of issues in dispute. The 
Adjusted Winner paradigm is a fair and equitable procedure because at the end of allocation, each 
party will have accrued the same number of points.  
If, as is generally the case, the disputants do not have directly opposing goals, it is likely that each 
disputant will receive more than fifty points. This is thus an improvement on any strategy that is 
based on the zero-sum game philosophy – where each party wins what the other loses. Where giving 
an issue/item to one party will lead to an inequality of points among the disputants, a form of 
proportional representation is used for the final issue in dispute. The final proposed solution might 
involve sharing some issues (such as selling a piece of property and distributing the money received 
from it or sharing custody of the children) to ensure that each of the disputants receives an equal 
number of points for the issues in dispute. 
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(Zeleznikow et al 2002) have previously used the multi-criteria decision-making approach. The 
most typical such approach requires the user to directly assign values to each alternative for a given 
criterion.  After setting forth the issues, the disputants must decompose such issues into sub-issues 
until their positions are reflected in the sub-issues. Each issue is broken down so that allocation issues 
are binary in form: each issue is allocated to either the Husband or the Wife. Their Family_Winner 
system uses a theory of pair-wise comparisons to determine whether the Husband or Wife is allocated 
an item or an issue. Upon reaching the lowest level in the hierarchy (as specified by the disputants), 
the system mathematically calculates the value of each sub-issue or item with respect to the relative 
super-issues or items. It does so for each party. Once completed, the system calculates which party is 
allocated particular sub-issues or items through pair-wise comparisons over the derived values from 
both parties (Bellucci and Zeleznikow 2001). 
(Sycara 1998) argues that one should assume bounded rationality and the presence of incomplete 
information in developing real-world negotiation support systems. Our model of legal negotiation 
assumes that all actors behave rationally. The model is predicated on economic bases, that is, it 
assumes that the protagonists act in their own economic best interests. While much human negotiation 
is not necessarily based upon rational economic behavior, we believe the goal of negotiation support 
systems should be to provide rational advice. Hence, the environment that we are developing 
therefore assumes the existence of rational actors. 
(Bellucci and Zeleznikow 2006) wished to integrate artificial intelligence and game theory 
techniques to develop intelligent negotiation support systems. Given their previous research on 
developing negotiation support systems in Australian family law, they decided to develop systems in 
that domain. They saw that an important way in which family mediators encouraged disputants to 
resolve their conflicts was through the use of compromise and trade-offs. Once the trade-offs have 
been identified, other decision-making mechanisms must be employed to resolve the dispute. From 
efforts to build negotiation support systems, they noted that while it appears counterintuitive: 
1. The more issues and sub-issues in dispute, the easier it is to form trade-offs and hence 
reach a negotiated agreement; and 
2. They choose as the first issue to resolve the one on which the disputants are furthest apart 
– one party wants it greatly, the other considerably less so. 
Family_Winner (Belluci and Zeleznikow 2006) uses both game theory and heuristics. In assisting 
the resolution of a dispute, Family_Winner asks the disputants to list the items in dispute and to attach 
importance values to indicate how significant it is that the disputants be awarded each of the items. 
The system uses this information to form trade-off rules. The trade-off rules are then used to allocate 
issues according to a “logrolling” strategy4
Family_Winner accepts as input a list of issues and importance ratings that represent a concise 
evaluation of a disputant’s preferences. In forming these ratings, the system assumes that the 
disputants have conducted a comparison of the issues.  As noted by (Sycara 1993), bargainers are 
constantly asked if they prefer one set of outcomes to another. Thus Sycara suggests considering two 
issues at a time, assuming all others are fixed. Family_ Winner uses a similar strategy in which pair-
wise comparisons are used to form trade-off strategies between two issues. 
. 
The trade-offs pertaining to a disputant are graphically displayed through a series of trade-off 
maps (Zeleznikow and Bellucci 2003).  Their incorporation into the system enables disputants to 
visually understand trade-off opportunities relevant to their side of the dispute. A trade-off is formed 
after the system conducts a comparison between the ratings of two issues. The value of a trade-off 
                                                 
 
4 Logrolling is a process in which participants look collectively at multiple issues to find issues that one party 
considers more important than does the opposing party. Logrolling is successful if the parties concede issues to 
which they give low importance values. See (Pruitt 1981). 
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relationship is determined by analyzing the differences between the parties, as suggested by 
(Mnookin et al 2000). 
Consider as an example a family law dispute in which the wife is awarded the marital home and 
the husband awarded the holiday house. Depending on how the husband and wife rated various 
issues, one might be compensated following the allocation of property to the other. Compensation is 
considered as an external reward, one that is not related to the issues on the table. Family_Winner 
awards compensation to parties that have either lost an issue they regard as valuable, or have been 
allocated an issue of little importance. 
The system implements compensation by either increasing or decreasing a party’s rating. It is then 
expected that changes made to a rating will influence the decision of a future allocation. The amount 
of any compensation resulting from the triggering of a trade-off has triggering been empirically 
determined from an analysis of data. The input consists of:  
1. Issues in dispute.  Both disputants are requested to enter the issues in dispute 
2. Ratings.  Once the issues and sub-issues have been established, the user enters numbers 
that reflect the importance of an issue or sub-issue (this is called a rating.   
3. Mutual Exclusiveness.  An issue is mutually exclusive of another issue, if as a result of 
allocating one issue, both issues are allocated simultaneously.  For example, the issues of 
primary residency and visitation rights to children are mutually exclusive, since if one 
parent has residency, then the other, save for exceptional circumstances, is allocated 
visitation rights. 
4. Unlike the case of input, the method by which output is presented by the system is not 
characterised by a sequential standard process.  These outputs include:  
5. Trade-off Maps.  Once new information has been entered into the system, or changes 
occur in the negotiation (for example to ratings following an allocation), the system 
displays two Trade-off Maps.  Each map represents the preferences and trade-offs 
pertaining to a party.  These diagrams provide disputants with an opportunity to 
diagrammatically assess their position in relation to all other issues.  
6. Summary Report.  Once an issue has been allocated to a party, a summary report 
describing the current state of issue allocation with respect to the preferences of both 
parties is displayed.  The summary report lists the issue recently allocated and the party to 
which it is allocated, all prior allocations, the value of issues before allocation and their 
current value, and a hierarchical map of all issues yet to be resolved. 
Family_Winner uses the Issue Decomposition Hierarchy (as described in detail in (Bellucci and 
Zeleznikow 2006)) to store all issues (and sub-issues) and makes use of Trade-off Maps to deliver a 
compensation strategy.  The output consists of a list of allocations, which form the basis of the advice 
provided by the system. 
In the next section we give an algorithmic description of how Family_Winner operates. 
3.3 A formalism for developing Family_Winner’s trade-offs 
3.3.1 Defining the problem 
The set of issues in dispute is: D = X ∪ Y where X = {X1, X2, … , Xn} is the set of issues that H sees 
as in dispute and Y = {Y1, Y2, … , Ym} is the set of issues that W sees as in dispute.  H and W give a 
significance value (rating) to each of the issues in D = {D1, D2, … , Dk} where m, n ≤ k ≤ m + n. 
These significance values (or ratings) are denoted xD = {xD1, xD2 , … , xDk} and yD = {yD1, yD2 , … , 
yDk} respectively. 
The function [1] normalises each party’s significance values, so that they both sum to one 
hundred.   
NEW(xDi) = (xDi * 100)/ Σ xDi and NEW(yDi)   = (yDi * 100)/ Σ yDi where i ε {1, 2, …, k}          
  [1]     
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Each issue can be decomposed into sub-issues Di = {Di,1, …, Ddi,,g(i)},  where g(i) is the number of 
sub-issues for issue Di. 
The rating of an issue refers to the value of an issue to a party.  The rating of a parent issue is its 
numerical rating provided by disputants, while the rating of a sub-issue is represented by a percentage 
of the parent issue’s rating. The value of sub-issues, with respect to the rating of their parent issues is 
calculated next and is defined as a P-rating.   
So the initial issue (such as child welfare) is now deleted from the list of issues to be considered 
and replaced by the sub-issues.  The p-ratings take into account the ratings of both issues and sub-
issues. P-ratings incorporate the influence of a parent issue to form the rating of a sub-issue.  P-ratings 
are calculated according to the following equation:  
If sub-issue Di is given ratings {xDi,1, …, xDi,g(i))} where Σ xDi,j= 100; and {yDi,1, …, yDi,g(i))} where 
Σ yDi,j= 100; then the p-rating for Xdi,j is xdi * xdi,j /100 and the p-rating for Ydi,j is ydi * ydi,j /100                               
[2]                  
It should be noted that only the ratings of the initial issues and sub-issues are normalised.  So after 
the initial normalisation, there is no reason why ratings or subratings should sum to 100. 
Example
3.3.2 Choosing the order of allocation 
: Suppose, Party H gives issue1 a rating of 60, and issue2 a rating of 40.  Suppose further 
that issue 1 has sub-issues 11 and 12 and that party H gives them ratings of 10 and 90 respectively. 
Then Issue11 has a p-rating of 6 (10% of 60 = 6), and Issue12 has a p-rating of 54 (90% of 60 = 54).   
The order in which issues are considered for decomposition or allocation is then calculated.  
Specifically, the function in [2], choose(i)  calculates the numerical difference between the ratings set 
by both parties towards the same issues. 
Let set D* = {d1, d2, …, dk}  be the set of differences between the ratings of the issues in dispute, 
where di = |xDi – yDi | with i ε {1, 2, …, k}. The issue with the highest di value will be presented first.   
choose(1) = max {di: 1<= i <= k}. The choose function, choose (i), for i > 1, will operate on 
revised ratings.  So choose (2) will be the maximum of the differences in revised ratings with: (a) The 
first issue allocated is removed from the list of revised ratings; (b) The revised ratings following the 
allocation of the first issue are used.  The function is defined recursively.    [3] 
A brief discussion of revised ratings will be conducted in 3.3.4. These Mediators and disputants 
can choose to either decompose the issue into sub-issues or directly allocate it.  
Example
3.3.3 Allocating Issues 
: Suppose Party H has issue1 with value of 60, issue2 with value of 40 and issue 3 with a 
value of 0.  Party W has issue1 with a value of 50, issue2 with a value of 30 and issue 3 with a value 
of 20.  The difference calculation for issue1 is 10, while the corresponding calculation for issue2 is 10 
and the corresponding calculation for issue3 is 20.  Therefore D is the set {10,10,20}.  Since issue3 
has the highest value of 20 in set D, the system will suggest to the disputants that they negotiate over 
Issue3 first. 
Compromising is a hybrid approach of the above four. It is used to describe behaviours that are both 
moderate in assertiveness and cooperativeness. In the process of conflict resolution, the objective is to 
find a mutually acceptable solution for both parties.  
As a result, some degree of concession has to be made by all the parties involved. From the 
definition, it is an approach between competing and accommodating; similarly, it is also lies in the 
middle of avoiding and collaborating. 
3.3.4 Third level heading 
Once a decision on which issue to distribute has been made, the issue needs to be distributed.  In the 
above example, issue3 is distributed first.  H had a rating of 0 for issue3 whilst W gave it a rating 20.  
Thus W is awarded issue 3. H needs to be compensated because W is awarded 3.   
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At any step we need a function to keep a record of how many points each disputant has received at 
time t.  Let us call this function GAIN(z,t). Our eventual goal is to have GAIN(H,FINAL) fairly close 
to GAIN(W,FINAL). [4] 
In the example above, GAIN(H,1) = 0 and GAIN (W,1) = 20. 
If an issue does not require decomposition or has been sub-divided appropriately, the issue is 
allocated according to the issue’s importance rating.  The ratings of issues are hence compared.  
Essentially, the party whose rating is greatest is allocated the issue.  If the ratings are of equal value, 
then the next issue to be considered for allocation is presented.  Formally, this algorithm is presented 
as follows:  
If xDi  ≥ yDi then issue i is allocated to H, else issue i is allocated to W, where i ε {1, 2, ..., k}  [5] 
Once an issue (or issues) has been allocated, the remaining issues are affected to varying degrees, 
according to trade-offs executed as a result of the allocation.  The extent to which the ratings of issues 
change is dependent on whether an issue is lost or gained, the ratings of issues forming trade-offs, and 
strength of the trade-off (represented by relationship figures).  The values of these variables combined 
to form a series of graphs, used to extract the amount of change affecting ratings.   
3.3.5 Performing Trade-Offs 
Once issues and sub-issues have been allocated we need to perform trade-offs to compensate the loser 
of the issue or sub-issue. To support the awarding of compensation, we develop Trade-off Maps.  
These diagrams are indicative of possible trade-offs between pairs of issues.   
The trade-off maps were empirically developed using data provided to us by four different 
sources: (a) Thirty-six surveys of Mediator questionnaires obtained from the department of Law and 
Legal Studies at La Trobe University; (b) a series of interviews conducted with four Family Law 
mediators from the Family Mediation Centres in both Noble Park and Ringwood, Victoria, Australia; 
(c) a set of six hundred mediation transcripts provided by the Australian Institute of Family Studies 
(d) Family Law negotiation simulations we conducted, held in conjunction with the Law School at 
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia and with the Graduate School of Business at Bar-Ilan 
University in Ramat Gan, Israel.   
A detailed discussion of trade-off maps can be found in (Bellucci 2004). It involves a discussion 
of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (Saaty 1980) and the development of a matrix of pair-wise 
comparison of issues and sub-issues. 
The function which advises upon the allocation of issues to H and W is given in [5].  [1] performs 
normalization, [2] calculates p-ratings, [3] defines the metric which is used to decide which issue is 
first allocated whilst [4] stores the sum of the values that each party has received.  There is no claim 
that the functions are in any way optimal. 
Following advice from family-law lawyers and mediators at Victoria Legal Aid and Relationships 
Australia, we always choose Child Welfare Related issues as the first issue to be allocated.  However, 
in our generic model of the development of decision support systems for bargaining in the shadow of 
the law, we make no such presumption. 
Data analysis of six hundred cases provided by the Australian Institute of Family Studies, revealed 
several heuristics relevant to our investigation on the development of Family_Winner’s allocation 
strategy.  For example, if the issue lost is very important, and the strength of relationship is very 
significant, then the values of the relevant issue will increase.  If a very important issue is allocated to 
a party, and the strength of relationships are very significant, then the ratings of relevant issues will 
not change.  A relationship is considered very significant if the relationship factor is high. 
Results from the above-mentioned analysis were used to form a series of ten graphs, as described 
in (Bellucci, 2004).  Each graph illustrates the change to issues following an issue’s allocation.  Each 
graph symbolises a different scenario based on whether the issue was gained or lost, and the 
importance exhibited by the rating of the allocated issue.  Graphs are consulted to determine the 
appropriate level of compensation awarded following an allocation.  Specifically, graphs provide the 
percentage change to be applied (Y-axis) given the level of discourse surrounding an issue (X-axis).  
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Values on the X-axis represent the difference between the ratings of each issue, calculated according 
to equations [4] and [5].  The range of the X-axis is from 0 –100, where 0 indicates issues of minimal 
argument, and 100 indicating a greater level of discourse exhibited by the issue.  The Y-Axis 
indicates the amount of change resulting from an allocation.  It has values ranging from -100 to 100, 
to indicate the most negative change to the most positive change applied to the value of a rating.  
To illustrate how Family_Winner uses these graphs, suppose party H lost Issue1, assigned a rating 
of 70.  Since Issue1 is valued Very Important (according to a linguistic assignment to ratings, given in 
Table 1), then a graph GraphLost4 (Figure 2) is consulted to retrieve compensation figures.  Assume 
the following issues exist, where Issue2 exhibits a rating of 20, and Issue3 is valued by 10.  The 
relationship factors are in the amounts of 50 (for trade-off between Issue 1 and issue 2) and 60 (for 
trade-off between Issue 1 and Issue 3).  These numbers, corresponding to X-axis values, are then 
applied to the graph.  The corresponding Y-axis recommended 75% change to Issue 2 and 50% 
change to Issue 3.  
Table 1.  Linguistic importance assignments to rating ranges 
Rating range Linguistic Importance assignment 
<= 10 Not Important 
11 to 20 Moderately Important 
21 to 35 Important 
36 to 55 Quite Important 
> 55 Very Important. 
 
We have included one graph, GraphLose4 as Figure 1, to give the reader a sample of the graphs.  
There are in total ten diagrams, each one representing the compensation levels for every category 
(determined by the value of the issue), and whether it is lost or gained. The remaining graphs can be 
found in (Bellucci, 2004) at p108-117.  
 
Figure 1.  GraphLose4: a sample taken from graphs used in the calculation of compensation figures 
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The amount of compensation awarded is calculated by graphs that were derived from data 
obtained from domain experts.  The example graph in Figure 1 indicates the level of compensation, to 
be awarded based on the value of ratings, the strength of the trade-off relationship and whether the 
issue has been lost or gained by a disputant.  Whilst it is obvious why a party losing an issue should 
be compensated, it is equally important to reward a party for being allocated an issue that she did not 
value importantly5
The manner in which compensation is awarded is dependent upon the value of a percentage 
change, applied to relevant ratings.  Once the percentage change of all affected issues has been 
derived (from the graph functions), the values of new ratings are calculated.  To form new ratings, the 
percentage change relevant to an issue is retrieved and incorporated according to the following 
equation: 
. 
D is the union of the issues that have been raised by the disputants.  Cj is the union of all issues 
connected to an allocated issue, j.  For each di ε D, a set X is defined as the numerical rating 
calculated on behalf of a party, to each of the issues in D.  For each ci ε C, a set Y is defined as the 
percentage of change, obtained from relevant graph function f.  Thus X = {x1, x2, …,  xk} and Y = 
{f{x1), f(x2), …, f(xk)}.  
xDi = xi + xi * f(xi) /100 where i ε {1, 2, …, k} and f is determined empirically.     [6] 
Subsequent to allocation, the ratings of remaining issues may be modified due to compensation, to 
influence issue allocation in the following rounds of allocation.   
These new ratings (xDi) replace existing rating values (xi).  xDi values are then used to decide the 
outcome of the next round of allocation.  The program then displays a summary report to notify 
disputants on the current status of the negotiation.  The summary page displays the issues and parties 
to which the issues are allocated, both diagrammatically through the Issue Decomposition Hierarchy, 
and by generating a complete list of issues.  Both the old and new values of ratings, as a result of the 
recent allocation, are listed. 
The process of allocation and issue decomposition continues until there are no more issues to 
allocate, at which point the program ceases execution.   
It is important to note that the formulas mentioned in this section (equations [1-6]) were derived 
from our observation of data analysis, as opposed to representing proven mathematical formulae.  We 
believe negotiation is an art and not a science.  In addition, negotiation is characterised by changing 
ratings, which makes it difficult to arrive at a theoretical function.  We argue a theoretical function 
cannot exist, otherwise there would always be a perfect solution for each negotiation.  (Bellucci 2004) 
discusses in great depth the validity of the formulae through an analysis of case studies and in the 
formal evaluation of the Family_Winner system. 
3.4 The operation of Family_Winner on a hypothetical case 
The following example is taken directly from (Bellucci and Zeleznikow 2006).  It gives an excellent 
insight into the manner in which Family_Winner operates. 
Suppose Cassandra (Wife) and Paul (Husband) Jones have been married for fifteen years and have 
two sons aged thirteen and eleven.  Cassandra wants a divorce and an immediate property settlement.  
She also believes that although she received income from employment, throughout her marriage, her 
principal role was as a homemaker and a nurturer. 
Both agree to the distribution of the joint marital property consisting of a house, his Mitsubishi 
car, and her Holden car.  In addition, she believes she is entitled to a portion of her Husband’s share 
portfolio and of his superannuation (or pension) entitlements.  Cassandra wishes to retain the house 
                                                 
 
5 This scenario is highly unlikely to occur as the systems’ primary focus is to allocate issues to parties who 
value them the most. 
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and the Holden car, while Paul wishes to retain his Mitsubishi car and agrees to an equal share 
distribution of both the share portfolio and his superannuation entitlements. 
Cassandra believes she should receive primary residency of the children.  She consults a lawyer 
who advises her that given what Cassandra has told the lawyer, as the parent with current primary 
residency of the children, she should seek 60% of the marital property and adequate child allowance 
(this is in effect her BATNA).  The 60% of the marital property that she desires mainly consists of the 
matrimonial home and the holiday house.  She wishes to retain both of these properties. 
When Paul receives a letter of claims from Cassandra’s lawyer, he approaches a lawyer, who 
provides advice on developing an appropriate BATNA. 
The case is presented to the Family_Winner system, using the following data as input. 
Table 2. Initial input of Issues and ratings for use in the hypothetical Family Law Negotiation. 
Issue Husband’s ratings Wife’s ratings 
Child-related issues 70  50   
Property Issues 20  15   
Monetary Issues 10  35   
This information is then analysed by a number of functions.  These functions include the 
translation of data into Trade-off Maps, the relaying of information to the database, forming issue 
allocations and modifying the ratings of the issues in the negotiation to reflect allocations. 
Once the user has entered the data appropriately, the next screen displays Trade-off Maps 
generated by the system.  Figures 2 and 3 are the Trade-off Maps displayed to disputants following 


























Figure 3.  The Wife’s Trade-off Map after the initial input of the primary issues. 
The disputants are asked to decompose an issue into many smaller sub-issues. Sub-issues are then 
incorporated into the dispute through the formation of an Issue Decomposition Hierarchy.   
Child-related Issues is the first issue to be considered for decomposition or allocation.  Table 3 
lists the point allocations (ratings) given to each issue by the Husband and the Wife, and the ratings 
used in the dispute (p-ratings), which represent the influence of Child-Related Issues on the sub-
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issue’s initial point allocation.  P-ratings are calculated as a ratio of the parent issue’s rating.  For 
instance, Party A gives issue1 a rating of 60, and issue2 a rating of 40.  Issue11 has a p-rating of 10 
(10% of 60) = 6, and Issue12 a p-rating of 90 (90% of 60) = 54.   
Table 3.  Ratings and p-ratings for the sub-issues of Child-Related Issues. 
Issue Husband’s ratings and p-
ratings 
Wife’s ratings and p-ratings 
Residency 25                                   17.5 60                                    30 
Visitation Rights 50                                    35 10                                     5 
Child support 25                                    17.5 30                                    15 
The Trade-off Map is now altered to include the sub-issues of the primary issues.  The modified 

























































Figure 5.  The Wife’s Trade off Map incorporating the sub-issues of Child-Related Issues. 
Family_Winner allocates a parent issue through the allocation of its sub-issues.  Therefore, in this 
example, one of the issues listed in Table 2 will be allocated next.  All the sub-issues of Child-related 
Issues will be allocated before the negotiation moves to consider other issues.  
The system allocates an issue to one of the parties. The party whose rating is greatest for the issue 
is allocated the issue.  If both disputants value the issue equally, then the next issue to be allocated 
replaces the issue in question.  The rating of issues connected to the issue just allocated is revised, 
based on empirically derived mathematical functions. The allocation of an issue involves removal of 
the issue from the Trade-off Maps, and making appropriate changes to the ratings of affected issues.   
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The first issue in this example to be allocated is Visitation Rights.  It is awarded to the Husband, as 
his rating of 35 is greater than the Wife’s equivalent of 5.  As a result of the Husband’s allocation, the 
ratings of remaining issues are changed.  The following table lists all existing issues, their updated 
ratings and the percentage change resulting from the allocation of Visitation Rights to the Husband.  
Table 4. Changes made to the ratings of issues following the allocation of Visitation Rights to the 
Husband. 
Issue Name Husband’s ratings Wife’s ratings 
Child support 18.375 ( 5 % change) 15 ( 0 % change) 
Residency 18.375 (5 % change) 41.25 (37.5 % change) 
Monetary Issues 10.5 ( 5 % change) 52.5 (50 % change) 
Property Issues 21 ( 5 % change) 15 (0 % change) 
As a result of the Husband’s allocation of an issue he considered important (valued at 35 points), 
his ratings did not change considerably.  The Wife was duly compensated for her loss of Visitation 
Rights, valued relatively unimportant at 5 points.   
The relative Trade-off Maps of each party, shown in Figures 6 and 7, can be interpreted to explain 
the amount of change each rating experienced as a result of the allocation.  The Husband’s ratings 
experienced little change as the issue’s rating was considered by the system to be of great importance 
to the Husband.  All ratings experienced an increase of 5%, as the relationship figures between the 
issues and Visitation Rights were all similar in number.  Their relationship figures were 17 between 
Child Support, 17 between Residency, 25 between Monetary Issues and 15 between Property.  
The Wife was compensated for her loss of Visitation Rights (valued at 5 points), through those 
issues whose relationship with Visitation Rights is of relatively greater significance.  The trade-offs 
between Visitation Rights and Monetary Issues, and Visitation Rights and Residency held relationship 
values of 30 and 25 respectively.  These issues were the only ones whose ratings increased, with 
increases of 50% and 37.5% respectively.  Property Issues and Residency did not change their ratings, 
as their relationships with Visitation Rights were valued at 10 points each.   
Trade-off maps display the trade-offs currently applicable to the dispute.  Once an issue is 
removed from a dispute through allocation, the Trade-off Map is modified to reflect this change.  The 
issue is removed from the map, and the ratings of the remaining issues are re-calculated according to 
the values dictated by the applicable trade-off relationships.  
The resulting Trade-off Maps following the allocation of Visitation Rights are demonstrated in 






















Figure 6.  Husband’s Trade off Map after the allocation of Visitation Rights. 
 























Figure 7.  Wife’s Trade-off Map after the allocation of Visitation Rights. 
The system continues to traverse the hierarchy, by either allocating or decomposing issues, until 
all issues have been allocated.  A summary of subsequent allocations is found in Table 5. 
Table 5.  Allocation table for the hypothetical Family Law Dispute. 
Husband’s allocations Wife’s allocations 
Visitation Rights Residency 
Shares Superannuation 
Child Support Matrimonial Home 
Investment Unit Holiday House 
Mitsubishi Car Holden Car 
Boat  
3.5 The need for Justice Based Negotiation 
Traditional Negotiation Support Systems have focused upon providing users with decision support on 
how they might best achieve their goals (Raiffa, 1982). A fundamental issue arises whenever anyone 
builds a negotiation support system for use in legal domains: is the system being developed concerned 
with supporting mediation or providing justice?  When issues of justice are not reflected in the 
outcome of the mediation process, bargaining theory has its limitations. 
In December 2002, we met with a number of family law solicitors at Victoria Legal Aid to 
evaluate the performance of the Family_Winner system.  Whilst the solicitors were very impressed 
with how Family_Winner suggested trade-offs and compromises, they had one major concern – that 
Family_Winner in focusing upon mediation had ignored issues of justice. 
(Alexander 1992) has illustrated that women tend to be more reluctant than men to continue 
conflict and are more likely to wave their legal rights in a mediation session.  If their major goal is to 
be the primary care giver for their children, they may reach a negotiated settlement, which whilst 
acceptable to them, is patently unjust.  The wife may for example, give the husband the bulk of the 
property, in return for her being granted the primary care of the children.  Whilst such an arrangement 
may meet the goals of both parents, it does not meet the paramount interests of the children, who will 
be deprived of subsequent financial resources.  Family Law is one domain where interest-based 
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notions of mediation conflict with notions of justice.  In such domains, the use of negotiation support 
systems that attempt to equally satisfy both parties is limited6
One lesson learned from the evaluation of family law disputes is that suggested compromises 
might conflict with law and justice. This problem can arise where a fully automated Online Dispute 
Resolution (ODR) environment is used in which resolution is based on consensus. Nevertheless, we 
believe that our ODR environment may still play a positive role in the family-law setting. One 
safeguard for use of ODR in fields such as family law may be required certification of the result by a 
legal professional. 
. 
4 Integrating interests with fairness 
4.1 Consistency and Justice in Family Mediation and Plea Bargaining 
Alexander (1997) has argued that in Australian Family Law, women tend to be more reluctant than 
men to continue conflict and are more likely to wave their legal rights in a mediation session. In 
discussing Australian Family Law, Bellucci and Zeleznikow (2006) claim that mediation may conflict 
with the notion of justice.  McEwen et al (1995) believe family mediators focus upon procedural 
fairness rather than outcome fairness. Phegan (1995) argues that differences in power between men 
and women lead to negotiated results that favour men.  Bargaining imbalances thus produce unfair 
results unless mediators can overcome them. 
Although not always known as “plea bargaining”, guilty plea negotiations in Australia are 
commonplace, (Mack and Roach Anleu, 1996) although not necessarily openly used (Seifman and 
Freiberg, 2001). Plea bargaining is inherently useful to the criminal justice system, not just because of 
administrative efficiency; as it enables the accused, if properly advised, to negotiate concessions in 
the form of reduced charges or which facts are to be put before the court (Seifman and Freiberg, 
2001).  It is critical however that the accused has as certain as possible an indication of the sentence 
which will be imposed (Mack and Roach Anleu, 1995), and this is where the current system is 
lacking.  At present, this is a major problem in justice and consistency for defendants, and one which 
this project addresses. 
There are possible negative consequences of negotiating about pleas. Bibas (2004) argues that 
many plea bargains diverge from the shadow of trials.  He claims that rather than basing sentences on 
the need for deterrence, retribution, incapacitation or rehabilitation, plea bargaining effectively bases 
sentences in part on wealth, sex, age, education, intelligence and confidence. Bibas suggest that while 
trials may allocate punishment imperfectly, plea bargaining adds another layer of distortions and 
warps the allocation of punishment.  
Adelstein and Miceli (2001) develop a general model of plea bargaining, embed it in a larger 
framework that addresses the costs of adjudication, the value of punishing the guilty and the costs of 
false convictions, and then link the desirability of plea bargaining and compulsory prosecution to the 
weights given these costs and benefits in the objective function.  Gazal-Ayal (2006) investigates the 
economics of plea bargaining.  He proposes having a partial ban on plea bargains, which prohibits 
prosecutors from offering substantial plea concessions. He argues that such a ban can act to 
discourage prosecutors from bringing weak cases and thus reduce the risk of wrongful convictions. 
Tor et al (2006) conducted experiments in which they determined that defendants' willingness to 
accept a plea bargain is substantially reduced when defendants feel that the offer is unfair, either 
because they are not guilty or because other defendants received better offers.  Wright and Miller 
(2003) believe that pervasive harm stems from charge bargains due to their special lack of 
                                                 
 
6 (Wade 2004) disagrees.  He argues that is very rare for Family Court judges to over-ride the wishes of the 
parents. 
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transparency. They argue that charge bargains, even more than sentencing concessions, make it 
difficult after the fact, to sort out good bargains from bad, in an accurate or systematic way. 
Following advice from both Victoria Legal Aid and Relationships Australia, (Bellucci and 
Zeleznikow 2006) realised they needed to adapt the Family_Winner system to meet both parents’ 
interests and the paramount interests of the children.  This research involves combining both interest-
based and justice-based notions of negotiation. 
4.2 The Family_Mediator System – integrating notions of justice into the 
Family_Winner system 
The Family_Winner system was designed to help mediators encourage disputants to settle their 
disputes through the use of trade-offs.  The system focused upon trying to determine each of the 
disputant’s interests and then uses game theory to suggest good solutions (not necessarily optimal).  
But as indicated in section 3.5, Australian family law focuses upon the paramount interests of the 
children, not upon the interests of the parents. 
In late 2005, the Family_Winner system achieved much media attention, including over a dozen 
radio interviews in all Australian states, on BBC Radio 5 and separately the BBC World Service, 
articles in the Sydney Morning Herald7, the Times of London, the Australian Financial Review and 
the Economist8.  The inventors were asked to compete on ABC (Australian Broadcasting 
Commission) New Inventors television show on November 16 2005.  They won their heat9
As a result of this publicity, Professor Zeleznikow and Dr. Bellucci received much interest in 
commercializing Family_Winner.  One expression of interest came from the Queensland branch of 
Relationships Australia. Relationships Australia is one of Australia’s largest community-based 
organisations providing relationship support to people.  It provides advice to couples that are 
contemplating divorce.  The Queensland Branch of Relationships Australia
. 
10
Instead of Family_Winner attempting to meet both parents’ interests to basically the same degree, 
mediators at Relationships Australia determine what percentage of the common pool property the 
wife should receive (e.g. 60%).  This advice can also be tendered by the Split_Up system. 
 wants to use a modified 
version of Family_Winner to provide decision support for their clients.  The application domain is 
concerns agreements about the distribution of marital property.  
A major issue of concern to Relationships Australia is how to equate the percentage of property 
with the interests of the couple.  It is not necessary that there be a direct connection between the 
financial value of an item and the points-value that each party in the dispute attaches to the item.  
Indeed, a major issue in dispute may involve determining the value of the item.  For example 
following a divorce, the husband may agree that the wife should be awarded the marital home.  In this 
case it would be in his interests to overvalue the house (say he suggests it is worth $1,200,000) whilst 
it is in the wife’s interests to undervalue the house (say she suggests it is worth $800,000).  So how 
can our new system (Family_Mediator) help resolve the issue? 
Our strategy is thus: 
1. The mediator involved in helping resolve the dispute makes decisions about how many 
points the husband and wife should each receive.  The mediator could use the Split_Up 
system if this is seen as beneficial.  Say the wife receives X% and Husband (100 – X) %  
                                                 
 
7 http://smh.com.au/articles/2005/09/20/1126982062322.html   last accessed November 29 2006 and 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/next/game-theory-for-negotiators/2005/11/14/1131816858584.html last accessed 
November 29 2006. 
8 http://economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_VVSTQRG last accessed November 29 2006. 
9 http://www.abc.net.au/newinventors/txt/s1504763.htm last accessed November 29 2006. 
10  See http://www.relationships.com.au/who-we-are/state-and-territory-organisations/qld last accessed 
November 29 2006. 
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2. The mediator decides on the value of each item in dispute. 
3. Both the Husband and Wife give points to each of the items in dispute11
4. The Family_Mediator system then suggests trade-offs and compensations so that the wife 
receives T*(50 + X) points and the husband receives T*(150 - X) points where T is the 
number of points each party would receive under the original Family_Winner system.   
. 
Initially we believed that the distribution of the Family_Mediator system should suggests trade-
offs and compensations so that the ratio of the wife’s points to the husband’s points is X:(100 – X).  
As an example, in step a), the mediator would suggest the wife should receive 60% of the property.  
Then in d), rather than each party receiving 70 points, the wife receives 150% of 70 points, or 105 
points and the Husband receives 66 2/3% of 70 points or 47 points.  This algorithm may however lead 
to the husband rejecting the suggestion. 
The revised algorithm, as described above, derives what may well be considered as a more 
acceptable suggestion: where the wife receives 110% of 70 points, or 77 points and the Husband 
receives 90% of 70 points or 63 points. 
The development of Family_Mediator allows the concept of interest-based negotiation as 
developed in Family_Winner to be integrated with notions of justice.  The advice about principles of 
justice can be provided by decision support systems that advise about BATNAs (e.g. Split_Up) or 
human mediators. 
4.3 Extending the Family_Mediator  System 
Unlike the Family_Winner system, Family_Mediator system allows users to input negative values12
Further, to ensure that Family_Mediator proposes an acceptable solution, it might be necessary to 
include as a universal issue in all disputes, a cash variable payment item.  For example, where the 
wife has identified that her highest preference is to retain the family home, an outcome might provide 
for her to keep the matrimonial home and the mortgage
.  
This development is necessary because family mediation clients often have debts (such as credit card 
debts and mortgages) which are as much items in the negotiation as assets. 
13
A further limitation of the Family_Winner system (arising from its similarity to the 
AdjustedWinner algorithm) is the need for users to enter numerical values.  Whilst disputants can 
probably linearly order
.  In order to reach an acceptable settlement, 
the wife might need to make a cash payment to the husband.  Hence we have stipulated the 
requirement that a variable appear in the output. 
14
Description 
 the significance to them of all items in dispute, it is unrealistic to expect 
them to give a numerical value to each item.  But it is not unreasonable for the users to assign a 








Very Important 50 
                                                 
 
11  As in the entering of the points into the Family_Winner system, the points are normalized to 100. 
12  Thanks are due to Natasha Rae of Relationships Australia (Queensland) for this suggestion. 
13  A negative item. 
14 A set {x1, x2, …, xn} is linearly ordered if it is of the form  x1 <= x2 <= … <= xn.      
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Essential 60 
Suppose the parties enter the following terms for the issues in dispute in the example given in 
section 3.4. 
Item H description and thus  unscaled 
points 
W description and thus  unscaled 
points 
Residency Little Significance         10 Essential                60 
Visitation Rights Very Important              50 Irrelevant                0 
Shares Important                       40 Little Significance 10 
Superannuation Little Significance         10 Moderate                30 
Child Support Moderate                       30 Irrelevant                  0 
Matrimonial Home Irrelevant                        0 Important                40 
Investment Unit Marginal                       20 Irrelevant                  0 
Holiday House Irrelevant                        0 Marginal                 20 
Mitsubishi Car Marginal                       20 Irrelevant                  0 
Holden Car Irrelevant                        0 Moderate                30 
Boat Marginal                       20 Irrelevant                  0 
The husband’s total score is 200.  Thus to scale his scores each number is multiplied by 100/200 = 
0.5.  The wife’s total score is 190.  Thus to scale her scores each number is multiplied by 100/190 = 
0.53.  This leads to a points table: 
Item H Points W points 
Residency 5 32 
Visitation Rights 25 0 
Shares 20 5 
Superannuation 5 16 
Child Support 15 0 
Matrimonial Home 0 21 
Investment Unit 10 0 
Holiday House 0 11 
Mitsubishi Car 10 0 
Holden Car 0 16 
Boat 10 0 
These points are then utilised by the Family_Mediator algorithm. 
5 Sentencing and Plea Bargaining 
The use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in criminal law is fairly limited compared to its use in 
commercial law and family law.   Perhaps its major use has been in the criminal domain has been in 
the area of restorative justice15
                                                 
 
15  Restorative justice is a theory of justice that emphasises repairing the harm caused or revealed by criminal 
behaviour.  It is generally accomplished through cooperative processes that include all stakeholders, hence its 
possible classification as a form of Alternative Dispute Resolution.   Some of the programs and outcomes 
typically identified with restorative justice include:
 (Graef 2000). 
victim offender mediation; conferencing; sentencing circles; 
victim assistance and the use of victim impact statements;; restitution and community service.  
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Plea-bargaining is the process whereby the accused and the prosecutor in a criminal case work out 
a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval (Black 1990).  It usually 
involves the defendant’s pleading guilty to a lesser offence or to only one or some of the counts of a 
multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that possible for the graver charge.  
Without the concept of plea-bargaining, the United States Criminal system would grind to a halt. In 
the United States, over 90% of all criminal convictions come from guilty pleas (Colella 2004); with 
this figure rising to over 95% in the federal jurisdiction (Cook 2004). Most of these are secured 
through plea bargaining (Bar-Gill and Gazal Ayal 2006). 
The fact that in most American States there are minimum sentences for the most common crimes, 
ensures that the prosecution is able to enter into a plea bargain where they usually have some control 
over the final sentence. Stuntz (2004) suggests that the success of the plea bargaining process depends 
on the prosecutor’s ability to make credible threats of severe post-trial sentences.  Credible threats 
concerning sentence severity are enhanced in jurisdictions that have determinate sentencing regimes. 
Bibas (2004) has noted that some scholars treat plea-bargaining as simply another case of bargaining 
in the shadow of a trial. The shadow of trial concept was discussed by Mnookin and Kornhauser 
(1979).  By examining the case of divorce law, they contended that legal rights of each party could be 
understood as bargaining chips that can affect settlement outcomes.  Plea-bargaining in the United 
States, even though it has had the support of the Supreme Court for over thirty years16
Vincent and Zeleznikow (2005) have been constructing a plea-bargaining decision support system 
for Victoria Legal Aid in the Victorian lower (Magistrates) courts. VLA handles 80% of criminal law 
defense cases in Victoria.  It hence finds decision support systems that advise upon appropriate 
decisions for the sentencing of criminals, as well as systems that will help in the plea-bargaining 
process, very useful for training and providing support for novice lawyers. 
 has been 
heavily criticised because of the power of the prosecutor to engage in selective utilisation of the 
bargaining process. Bibas (2004) claims that trials in the United States already allocate punishment 
unfairly and that plea-bargaining adds another layer of distortion. Both Bibas and Stuntz have at the 
heart of their respective discussions the claim that the Mnookin-Kornhauser model is not really 
applicable to the plea bargaining process because of the great number of other influences on the 
actors/players in the plea-bargaining show/game than occurs in negotiations about divorce. 
Hall et al (2005) built a sentencing decision support system to help new defence lawyers at VLA 
make arguments to support their clients to receive the least onerous sentences. The use of a 
sentencing decision support system is only one method for providing a defendant with a BATNA. 
Lawyers could equally provide such advice. The plea-bargaining environment is not wholly reliant on 
an information system to provide a BATNA. The sentencing decision support system provides advice 
concerning possible sentences, but can also give information about how these sentences might be 
combined, either cumulatively or consecutively in the case of multiple charges. It must be 
remembered though that the sentence is not being negotiated, it is a plea of guilty to a particular 
charge or set of charges that is being decided. Cowdery (2005) has suggested that the plea-bargaining 
process is one of principled negotiation and it cannot proceed without informed agreement. The 
method of BATNA provision is the first step in providing support for this process. 
Once an offer is made it must be measured against the BATNA. The step of reality testing is very 
important in the process of alternative dispute resolution. (Sourdin, 2005) indicates that in the final 
stage of the negotiation process, reality testing provides an excellent method of ensuring that parties 
are fully aware of the agreement they are about to reach. The plea negotiation system is in the form of 
shuttle bargaining, an offer followed by a counter offer. The defence lawyer evaluates the 
quality/benefit of the offer and either accepts of rejects the offer and makes a new offer. The (Hall et 
                                                 
 
16 Brady v United States, 397 US 742 (1970). 
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al 2005) sentencing decision support system is being used to provide support for VLA lawyers 
involved in contest mentions in the Victorian Magistrates Court. 
Even though the Contest Mention is conducted in front of the magistrate, prior to the 
commencement of the day’s sitting, there is considerable negotiation between the defence lawyers 
and police prosecutors as to the charges that will proceed based on pleas of guilty. If the accused 
decides to plead guilty to the charges filed, the charges are dealt with at the time of the Contest 
Mention hearing. The facts of the case are presented to the magistrate by way of a written summary of 
the offence. It is this written summary that is one of the key negotiation elements, especially in terms 
of the admitted facts. Aggravating facts need to be down played whilst mitigating facts need to be 
emphasized. If charges are withdrawn then the summary needs to be adjusted to represent this fact. 
There is no transparency in this process, as the magistrates is presented with only an altered copy of 
the summary and it is this summary alone that is preserved on the record.17
Negotiation in the criminal justice system is not simply a matter of achieving a high conviction 
rate or higher than average sentences for criminals. There needs to be some notion of justice (Bar-Gill 
and Gazal Ayal 2006). Negotiation involves ordering priorities and this can be a difficult problem for 
defence lawyers with heavy caseloads. Decision support systems offer a way of ordering and 
weighing up various, often competing interests. Susskind (2000) suggests that intelligent checklists 
are important in reviewing compliance with legal regulations. For the domain of plea negotiation, 
intelligent checklists (as part of a larger support system) provide an excellent method for the 
prosecution to ensure that any plea-bargain that might be entered into meets all the necessary legal 
requirements and follows detailed prosecutorial guidelines.
 There is no formal record 
of this the process, nor are any reasons given to support the extremely discretionary actions of the 
prosecution. 
18
A defendant who receives poor legal representation in regards to plea-bargaining may find that an 
unfair deal is accepted; one which might otherwise have been rejected. In the United States, indigent 
defendants often hire defence counsel who charge flat rates. This usually increases the incentive to 
conduct a plea bargain (Rhode, 2004).  
  This results in lawyers having more 
accurate information and thus providing effective representation. 
Enhanced negotiation support can be provided by decision support systems. Decision support 
systems can provide an unbiased appraisal of an accused criminal’s situation. This can be performed 
by the provision of a BATNA, especially with respect to a possible sentence at the final disposition of 
the case. Organizing and prioritising the most important aspects for an appropriate outcome can bring 
about effective negotiation support. Considerations such as not receiving a conviction or keeping a 
fine as low as possible can be ordered and prioritized. Rhode (2004: p. 4) suggests that, “Court-
appointed lawyers’ preparation is often minimal, sometimes taking less time than the average 
American spends showering before work”.  
As part of the overall push to improve access to justice, decision support systems can help to 
achieve this goal (Zeleznikow 2002). In the United States, less than one percent of lawyers are in 
legal aid practice. More and more defendants are pushed to pro se19
                                                 
 
17 In the United States a landmark ruling by the Supreme Court, Blakely v Washington, (2004) 542 US 296 has 
made illegal the use of any and every fact that increases a defendant’s effective maximum sentence that has not 
been either admitted to by the defendant or determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 defence strategies and this is 
increasingly becoming the norm in Australia. 
18 For further details, the prosecutorial guidelines for federal (Australia wide) prosecutors are available at 
http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Prosecutions/Policy/ (last accessed December 6 2006). Victorian prosecutorial 
guidelines are available at 
http://www.opp.vic.gov.au/CA256F7000755DC3/page/Prosecutorial+Guidelines?OpenDocument&1=20-
Prosecutorial+Guidelines~&2=~&3=~ (last accessed December 6 2006). 
19 A pro se litigant is one who does not retain a lawyer and appears for himself in court. 
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In summary, plea-bargaining can be seen as a form of negotiation that has benefits of 
administrative efficiency for the prosecution and provides certainty for the defence.  The interests of 
the parties focus upon reduced sentences and reducing costs. In other negotiation domains, in 
particular industrial relations and family relationships, more complex trade-offs can be employed to 
meet the parties’ interests. 
5.1 Current and  Future Research 
As previously described, Family_Winner has recently received considerable media publicity.  As a 
result, we have been approached to commercialise the program.  Two specific projects, with Creative 
Binary Engineering and Relationships Australia, are taking place. Current research includes 
1. In conjunction with a commercial partner (Creative Binary Engineering) we are 
developing a generic web-based system to provide advice about dispute resolution using 
an interest-based approach.  
2. As described above, in conjunction with the Queensland Branch of Relationships 
Australia, we are developing a negotiation decision support system using both interested-
based and justice-based negotiation. 
3. The Australian Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Bill 2005 encourages 
employers and employees to conduct direct negotiations about employment conditions.  
Previously, under a centralised decision-making process, the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission made rulings about industrial disputes20
4. We are investigating principles for the successful negotiation of Information Technology 
Outsourcing Agreements. 
. Whilst the new legislation 
creates a Fair Pay Commission to ensure that all agreements meet five basic principles, the 
new legislation encourages interest-based negotiation rather than arbitrated or judicial 
decisions. It is thus an excellent domain in which to provide Negotiation Decision 
Support.  In conjunction with the School of Applied Economics at Victoria University, we 
are building a tailored system adapted from our generic web-based system to advise upon 
enterprise bargaining.  
5. We are developing a Family Law Environment using our three step process of dispute 
resolution, so that parties to a family dispute can receive advice about possible outcomes, 
exchange arguments and receive mediation advice about how best the disputing parties 
can attain their objectives. 
6. We are conducting two projects that involve the use of Information Technology to help 
resolve tourism disputes.  The first involves developing a framework for the resolution of 
complaints in the hotel sector.  The second project (in conjunction with a consortium of 
European Universities) involves developing decision support systems to help decrease 
criminal activities against tourists. 
Currently we are about to commence two projects that investigate the fairness and consistency of 
negotiation support systems in the legal domain.  In a project with title ‘Developing negotiation 
support systems in law which encourage more consistent and principled outcomes’ we argue that 
unless negotiation support systems are seen to advocate outcomes which arise from consistent and 
principled advice, disputants will be reluctant to use them.  Thus we propose conducting research that 
will develop measures for assessing the outcomes of online negotiation in the legal domains of 
sentencing, plea bargaining and family mediation. Such measures will form the basis of a new model 
for evaluating justice and consistency within online dispute resolution systems. The model will 
inform the construction of fairer and more consistent systems of IT-based negotiation support in the 
future. 
                                                 
 
20 Generally conducted between unions and employer groups. 
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To meet this goal we will: 
1. Develop models of consistency and justice based on two very distinct legal domains: 
sentencing and family law. Further, the knowledge about these domains will be shared 
from three distinct Common Law jurisdictions: Australia, Israel and USA. 
2. Develop information retrieval techniques to extract knowledge from textual legal and 
negotiation data. 
3. Use KDD techniques (such as association rules, Bayesian belief networks and neural 
networks) to compare litigated and negotiated family law cases. 
4. Develop models of disputation and negotiation in both family law and sentencing.  These 
models will then be tested to examine how closely they align with the notion of 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law (as compared to ‘pure’ interest-based negotiation). 
5. Use Lodder and Zeleznikow’s three step model for an Online Dispute Resolution 
Environment and Toulmin’s theory of argumentation to construct a generic online dispute 
resolution environment.  The development of such an environment on which to place 
various negotiation support systems will increase users’ access to justice. 
6. Develop and evaluate specific sentencing and negotiation support systems using our 
newly developed Online Dispute Resolution Environment. 
While producing significant information technology and socio-legal advances, the project also 
develops innovative artificial intelligence techniques to help develop ‘consistent’ and ‘just’ 
negotiation support systems and an environment for online dispute resolution. 
(Gray et al 2007) argue that rather than develop negotiation support systems that are useful in 
resolving legal disputes, it is more important to develop systems that provide advice about how to 
avoid conflicts.  In domains such as family law and body corporate disputes, it is important for the 
disputants to have ongoing relationships once the disputes have been resolved.  Hence it is vital to 
develop software that focuses upon developing ongoing relationships, rather than focusing upon 
interests, justice (using BATNAs) or power.  Negotiation support systems that incorporate machine 
learning and planning can help in this regard.  
6 Conclusion 
Traditional negotiation support systems have focused upon either integrative or distributive 
negotiation.  Whilst integrative bargaining may meet the needs of the parties involved in a dispute, it 
often fails to address issues of fairness or justice. 
In this paper, we have considered a case study of an integrative bargaining system 
Family_Winner, which uses artificial intelligence and game theory to advise mediators about 
potential trade-offs and compromises for divorcing couples.  In evaluating Family_Winner, we 
observed that the system concentrates on the interests of the parents, rather than the paramount 
interests of the children.  Give that the paramount interests of the children is foremost, we developed 
a system, Family_Mediator, which incorporates notions of fairness (as decided by either a mediator, a 
family law practitioner or a decision support system) with the interests of the parents. 
Plea-bargaining, on the other hand, has benefits of administrative efficiency for the prosecution 
and provides certainty for the defence. Because of it significance, especially in the United States, we 
are developing decision support systems to enhance the plea-bargaining process.  We are also 
conducting further research on consistency and fairness of negotiation strategies that being 
incorporated into negotiation support systems. 
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